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ABSTRACT. Retributivists believe that punishment can be deserved, and that
deserved punishment is intrinsically good or important. They also believe that
certain crimes deserve certain quantities of punishment. On the plausible
assumption that the overall amount of any given punishment is a function of its
severity and duration, we might think that retributivists (qua retributivists) would
be indifferent as to whether a punishment were long and light or short and sharp,
provided the offender gets the overall amount of punishment he deserves. In this
paper I argue against this, showing that retributivists should actually prefer shorter
and more severe punishments to longer, gentler options. I show this by focusing
on, and developing a series of interpretations of, the retributivist claim that not
punishing the guilty is bad, focusing on the relationship between that badness and
time. I then show that each interpretation leads to a preference for shorter over
longer punishment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Retributivists believe that punishment can be deserved, and that
deserved punishment is intrinsically good or important.1 In contrast
with instrumentalists who believe that punishment, if justified at all,
is justified as a necessary evil,2 retributivists believe that punishment
is justified (at least in part) because we make the world better (in at
least one way) when people get what they deserve. Punishment
serves the value of retributive justice, and is to be pursued (at least
1 Given the subject of this paper, I should, perhaps, note at the outset that I am not a retributivist, or
at least not a committed one. But I am interested in the structure and the consequences of the view –
especially its implications for other areas of criminal law theory – and the present paper is written in
that spirit.
2 Bentham wrote: ‘Punishment itself is an evil, though necessary to prevent greater evils. Penal
justice, in the whole course of its operation, can only be a series of evils’. Jeremy Bentham, Theory of
Legislation, 2nd Edn (London: Trübner & Co., 1871), p. 360.
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in part) when and because it will further the realisation of that
value.3
Retributivists care not only about who should be punished and why,
they also care about how much punishment people receive. Retributivists
endorse proportionality in punishment: whilst violent assaults and
breaking the speed limit may both deserve some punishment, a world in
which assaults attract less punishment than speeding is retributively
unjust. For retributivists, it is controversial what crimes deserve what
punishment, and how such deserved punishments can or should be
calculated.4 For the purposes of this essay it does not matter whether
retributivists think that punishments ought to be absolutely or only
comparatively proportionate, nor whether the amount of punishment
deserved for a crime is fixed by universal morality, local moral sentiment,
or local legal rules. Nor does it matter why we should, or are permitted
to, criminalize behaviour and thus threaten people with punishment.
What matters is that the retributivist endorses the following proposition:
The Retributivist Belief: Within a political community, for any (just) crime C there is
some quantity of punishment, or range of quantities of punishment, P, that anyone
who commits C deserves. It is (in one way) good that those who commit C receive
P, and, conversely, (in one way) bad when those who commit C do not receive P.
Defining retributivism through the Retributivist Belief may be both
under-inclusive and over-inclusive in terms of philosophers’ self-
descriptions as ‘retributivist’.5 In many ways this is unproblematic – the
definition can be stipulative, and my argument can be aimed only at
those who endorse, or are tempted to endorse, this belief. I will briefly
lay out, however, several positions which are committed to the belief,6
3 This definition of ‘retributivist’ is possibly controversial. As is well-known, retributivism is a broad
church (John Cottingham, ‘Varieties of Retribution’, Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1979): 238–246; Nigel
Walker, ‘Even More Varieties of Retribution’, Philosophy 74 (1999): 595–605). My essay is only aimed at
those who endorse what I call ‘the Retributivist Belief’, which I outline below.
4 For the difficulties of doing so, see Greg Roebuck and David Wood, ‘A Retribution Argument
against Punishment’, Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2011): 73–86.
5 It is worth noting that the Retributivist Belief is different from (and less demanding than) the
Retributive Principle, around which I base much of the discussion in ‘Retributivists! The Harm Principle
is not for you!’ in Ethics (forthcoming).
6 For most of these positions, one might hold the Retributivist Belief in two different ways. One’s
ultimate conviction could be that it is an intrinsically good state of affairs that the guilty are punished
(and, conversely a bad state of affairs when they are not). Or one’s ultimate conviction might be that we
ought to punish the guilty, and that it is good when we do what we ought to, and bad when we don’t do
what we ought to. Following Derek Parfit’s taxonomy of egalitarian beliefs, we might call these
retributivist theories ‘telic’ and ‘deontic’ retributivisms respectively. See Mitchell N. Berman, ‘Two
Kinds of Retributivism’, in R. A. Duff and Stuart P. Green, Philosophical Foundations of the Criminal Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Derek Parfit, ‘Equality and Priority’, Ratio 10 (1997): 202–221.
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and I will explain why I think that those that are not so committed
should not be labelled ‘retributivist’.
The following types of retributivism (which collectively may be
called ‘positive reasons retributivisms’, since each believes desert to be
a positive reason for state punishment) are committed to the Retri-
butivist Belief. First, the kind of ‘pure’ retributivism, whose chief
proponent in recent times has been Michael Moore, will clearly see
deserved punishment as just and therefore good. As Moore says,
‘punishing the guilty achieves something good – namely, justice –
and…reference to any other good consequences is simply beside the
point’.7 Second, fair play retributivists, who focus on the relative
positions of criminals and law-abiding citizens, will see punishment as
reinstating a just distribution between the criminal and those who
have obeyed the law, and will see a just distribution as something
good.8 Third, those who think that desert is not the whole story of
justified punishment but think that it plays a positive role in justifying
punishment, will think that deserved punishment is in one way good,
regardless of whether it is all-things-considered justified.9 Such theo-
rists may either see desert as a necessary but not sufficient condition
for justified punishment, or they may see desert as neither necessary
nor sufficient, but simply as a consideration in favour of punishment.
Alongside positive reasons retributivists, some people who reject retri-
butivism completely as a reason for state punishment may also be (in a
qualified sense) within the ambit of the thesis presented here. We can call
these people ‘pure evaluation retributivists’. Such people will endorse the
Retributivist Belief if they believe that punishment of the deserving has
intrinsic value, but deny that the pursuit of that value can justify state
punishment. Such a view could consistently be held, for example, by a
political liberal who holds retributivism as part of her comprehensive moral
doctrine whilst denying that the state ought to act on such doctrines.10
7 Michael S. Moore, Placing Blame (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 111. See also: Robert Nozick,
Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 374.
8 See, for example: John Finnis, ‘The Restoration of Retribution’, Analysis 32 (1972): 131–135; Herbert Morris,
‘Persons and Punishment’, The Monist 52 (1968): 475–501; Jeffrie Murphy, ‘Marxism and Retribution’, Philosophy &
Public Affairs 2 (1972): 217–243; Richard Dagger, ‘Playing Fair with Punishment’, Ethics 103 (1993): 473–488.
9 See, for example, Douglas N. Husak, ‘Why Punish the Deserving?’, in his The Philosophy of Criminal
Law: Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); and Overcriminalization (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), Chap. 4.
10 For the classic statement of political liberalism, see John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1993). For more on retributivism and political liberalism, see Matt Ma-
travers, ‘Political Neutrality and Punishment’, Criminal Law and Philosophy 7 (2013): 217–230.
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For those who hold such a combination of views, my arguments here
concern which punishments (qua retributivist) they should prefer and not
which punishments they think the state should enact.
The group of retributivists who may be excluded from this
account are so-called ‘negative’ or ‘limiting’ retributivists. This group
of theorists claims that desert is a constraint on the use of punish-
ment (or a necessary condition for just punishment), but in no way
provides a reason for the state to punish.11 These theorists will not
endorse the Retributivist Belief provided they also claim that
deserved punishment is in no way good, therefore denying that
deserved punishment is either a reason to punish or a reason to find
intrinsic value in the punishment of the guilty.
I do not think that such theorists are really retributivists, insofar as
retributivism is tied to the concept of desert.12 It seems conceptually
confused to say that criminals deserve punishment but that this
supplies no reason why they should receive punishment and no
reason to think that punishment of the guilty is in any way intrin-
sically good. It seems a simple conceptual truth that if you deserve
something, then it is in one way positive that you receive it. Imagine
sitting on an awards committee, and making a case that Aruna
deserves the award. How would you react to your colleague saying
‘Oh yes, I completely agree. I absolutely think she deserves the
award. But I don’t see any reason why she should have it, and there
would be nothing good in her getting it’? These would be absurd
things to say. To those attracted to something like the negative
retributivist view, I think greater clarity would be achieved by
dropping references to retributivism and the concept of desert.
Something else, such as liability13 or rights forfeiture14 is surely doing
the moral work.
Given the Retributivist Belief, we need to find some way to map
quantities of punishment onto a scale of crimes. In order to do this,
one of the things we must do is to find a way of working out how
11 This characterisation is taken from R. A. Duff, ‘Legal Punishment’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (2013): http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/.
12 Hugo Bedau wrote that ‘Retributivism without desert…is like Hamlet without the Prince of
Denmark’. ‘Retribution and the Theory of Punishment’, The Journal of Philosophy 75 (1978): 601–620, at
p. 608. Emphasis in original.
13 See, for example: Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
14 See, for example: Christopher Heath Wellman, ‘The Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment’,
Ethics 122 (2012): 371–393.
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much punishment a given act of punishment delivers: it’s all very well
saying ‘Crime A must be punished more than Crime B’, but we need
to know which punishments are ‘more punishment’ than others. We
intuitively know that ten years imprisonment is more punishment
than a $10 fine, but exactly what the scale is and how it should be
calculated is difficult. Here, in only partial answer to this question,
I will put forward and rely upon an extremely plausible conjecture: a
punishment’s total quantity is a function of its severity and its
duration.15 Duration is how long the punishment lasts for.16 Severity
will be more controversial, but there are some modes of punishment
that are clearly more severe than others. For example, we know that
(provided he is relatively normal) punishing Glenn by banning him
from participating in crown green bowls is less severe than impris-
oning him. This is particularly easy to see since the greater pun-
ishment (imprisonment) contains everything that the less severe
punishment does (the crown green bowls ban) and more. Therefore,
if we keep the duration of punishment constant, to imprison Glenn is
to punish him more than to ban him from bowling. Keeping the
mode of punishment constant, punishing someone for longer is
clearly to punish them more – a ten year prison sentence is clearly a
greater punishment than a five year prison sentence under the same
conditions. As these examples show, the overall amount of punish-
ment supervenes both on the severity of the punishment and its
duration. Call this the Quantity of Punishment Conjecture.
The Quantity of Punishment Conjecture: P = S 9 t, where P = quantity of punish-
ment, S = severity and t = time.
I hope that the reader will agree that the Quantity of Punishment
Conjecture is intuitively plausible. This plausibility can be bolstered
further by thinking about what punishment is. Punishment is an
experience intentionally brought about by other human beings – it is
15 One way to envisage this claim is to see punishment as a graph, with severity on the y axis and
time on the x axis. The total amount of punishment will be the area under the graph.
16 Time may also play a complex role in calculating severity. For example, is keeping someone in
prison twice as long twice the overall punishment? Or does a given mode of punishment (e.g.,
imprisonment) become less severe over time, or perhaps more? Is punishing an 18-year old for a year
equally as severe as punishing an 80-year old for a year? I won’t try to answer such questions here, but
many of them depend on what exactly the metric of punishment is – for example do offenders deserve a
loss of wellbeing, or liberty? I am grateful to Oxford’s Jurisprudence Discussion Group for interesting
discussion here.
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a combination of action (punisher) and experience (punished).17
Since all human actions and all human experiences are temporal they
always have a duration, and so punishment will always have a
duration. And to experience something for longer, it seems, is to
experience more of it (think, for example, of pain, or a loss of
liberty). Sometimes it will be difficult to pick out which experience is
relevant, and so what the duration of a specific punishment is.18
However, given the overall plausibility of the idea that punishments
have a duration, I think we have very good reasons to try. I won’t try
to defend the Quantity of Punishment Conjecture further here.
Here is a plausible assumption about retributivism. Retributivists
(qua their retributivism) have no reason to care what combination of
S and t makes up P. If there is a permissible range of punishments
that all give the offender what he deserves, the retributivist, we may
naturally think, will be indifferent between those punishments. If
banning Glenn from crown green bowling for ten years gives the
same overall quantity of punishment as imprisoning him for a
month, and that overall quantity corresponds to the amount of
punishment that Glenn deserves for his crime, then the retributivist
should (at least from the perspective of her retributivism) be equally
happy either way. Call this The Indifference Claim.
17 A possible exception is the death penalty, which offers difficulties for the Quantity of Punishment
Conjecture. It is clearly extremely severe, but it is hard to tell how long it lasts for, or whether it is
experienced (due to the complex metaphysics of death). A plausible duration is ‘how long the person
would otherwise have lived for’, since they are robbed of their life for that amount of time. (This seems
to be implied by ‘deprivation accounts’ of the badness of death, on which see: Jeff McMahan, The Ethics
of Killing (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), Part 2; John Broome, Weighing Lives (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004), Chap. 17.) I won’t try to settle such matters here. I will instead focus on
punishments that fall short of death.
18 For example, a Law and Philosophy referee has suggested that it is difficult to tell how long fines
last for, and that this a reason to doubt whether the Quantity of Punishment Conjecture captures
anything. In terms of how long fines last for, what we care about here is how long it is until the
punishment is over in the relevant sense, how long it is until justice has been done. There are two
possible views on fines. One is that they are ‘over’ as soon as they are paid. (In which case, my
argument here suggests that retributivists should generally prefer fines, and for them to be paid
immediately, since they are very quick forms of punishment.) However, I doubt that fines are ‘over’ in
the relevant sense as soon as they are paid. My own (tentative) view (which I cannot fully elaborate
here) is that it is difficult to work out how long fines last for because fines in fact allow the offender to
choose the combination of time and severity. In order to see this, we must first think of what the
relevant experience of being fined is. It is having less money, which can be seen as either a lowering of
living standards/resources or a loss of liberty (for reasons articulated by, among others, G. A. Cohen in
‘Freedom and Money’, in his On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice and Other Essays in Political Philosophy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011)). Both a lowering of living standards and a loss of
liberty have durations. But since the offender can choose to reduce his standard of living and/or options
drastically for a short time (‘I won’t go out for a month!’) or less drastically for a longer time (‘I will
have one fewer cappuccino per week for two years’) then he is able to choose which combination of
severity and time he prefers.
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The Indifference Claim: (All else equal) retributivists are indifferent between shorter, more
severe punishments and longer, less severe punishments. Retributive justice simply
requires that we give an offender the overall amount of punishment she deserves (P).
Retributivists may have many reasons to prefer some combinations
of S and t over others. For example, they may learn that, since its
quirkiness attracts a lot of media attention, banning Glenn from
crown green bowls has a greater deterrent effect than imprisoning
him. Whether or not the retributivist believes deterrence to have any
role in justifying punishment, if one way of giving deserved
punishment begets better deterrent effects, thereby lessening harm,
retributivists have reason to prefer that way.
Importantly, the retributivist may have a threshold past which they
view a punishment as impermissibly severe, and so will reject any
punishment above a certain value of S.19 For example, flogging someone
for ten minutes may be the same overall quantity of punishment as
imprisoning them for a month, but, because of respect for persons,
retributivists may believe that flogging represents a level of severity or
type of punishment which it is impermissible to administer.20
Retributivists may also find that quick punishments are less
harmful to criminals’ family members,21 or are cheaper for the tax-
payer. But these are not inherently retributivist reasons for preferring
some combinations of S and t over others, and the Indifference
Claim simply asserts that retributivists will be indifferent between
combinations qua retributivists.
In this paper, I will argue that, despite its plausibility, retributiv-
ists should, in fact, reject the Indifference Claim.22 This is because
19 There are two different ways that the retributivist might view impermissibly severe punishments.
She may believe that they’re not deserved (in which case the punishment is not within the range of
deserved punishments, and so may be immediately discounted), or she may believe the punishment is
deserved but impermissible (in which case, the Indifference Claim would assert that the impermissible
punishment is on a par with other deserved punishments qua retributivist justice, but ruled out for non-
retributivist reasons).
20 For a critical examination of this (commonly held) position, see Kevin Murtagh, ‘Is Corporally
Punishing Criminals Degrading?’, Journal of Political Philosophy 20 (2012): 481–498.
21 I am grateful to a member of Oxford’s Jurisprudence Discussion Group for this observation.
22 Retributivists who endorse strict interpretations of Lex Talionis (who really think, for example, ‘an
eye for an eye’) may reject the Indifference Claim on different grounds, since they may claim that what is
deserved is a very particular experience (and therefore deny that a plurality of combinations of S and t can
give the offender what he deserves). However, arguably such retributivists would have balked at the
Retributivist Belief, since they may deny that there is some quantity of punishment that an offender
deserves, but rather some particular experience. For retributivists who endorse laxer interpretations of Lex
Talionis, however, there will often be a plurality of possible combinations which meet Lex, and where this
is so, I claim, they should prefer those with shorter durations (and therefore more severe modes). For a lax
interpretation of Lex, see Jeremy Waldron, ‘Lex Talionis’, Arizona Law Review 34 (1992): 25–51.
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retributivists should not be indifferent over the time taken to punish.
Retributivists (qua their retributivism, rather than for non-retributivist
reasons) should prefer shorter punishments to longer punishments, and
thus – in order that P be kept constant – should prefer more severe to less
severe punishments. When all else is equal, of the different punishments
that give the offender what she deserves, the retributivist should want to
see the shortest and severest of the permissible options handed down.
It is important to note that I do not make this claim as a positive or
intuitively attractive argument. I am not saying that I think retribu-
tivists should prefer more severe punishments because more severe
punishments are in themselves morally attractive. Nor am I saying
that retributivists actually currently think this, or will welcome this
entailment. I am simply saying that I think this logically follows from
the Retributivist Belief (which, as I have made clear, I think follows
conceptually from the claim that punishment can be deserved).
That retributivists should prefer shorter punishments becomes
clear once we switch focus from the positive retributivist claim that
deserved punishment is good to the converse claim that not punishing
those who deserve punishment is bad. Call this retributivism’s
‘badness claim’. Once we think about how to understand this bad-
ness claim, and in particular its relationship to time, then it becomes
clear, on any plausible understanding of the badness claim, that
retributivists should prefer the guilty to be punished quickly (and
thus severely).
The essay proceeds as follows. In the following section I outline a
series of time periods related to punishment. This allows me to
restate my thesis with greater clarity. In Sect. III I outline a series of
ways to understand retributivism’s badness claim – the badness of
not punishing the guilty. Perhaps none of these captures the whole
truth about the badness of such non-punishment, but the views
I articulate are centred around the major candidates for considerations
of such badness (and thus the considerations may be combined with
one another to define the whole truth). In Sect. IV I will then show
how each understanding of, or consideration of, the badness of non-
punishment of the deserving supports quicker over slower punish-
ment. This in turn (since we are aiming to deliver a certain quantity,
or range, of punishment – i.e., we are trying to keep P constant)
shows that retributivism prefers more over less severe punishments.
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II. PUNISHING TIMES
Before we proceed to the main argument, it will be worth distin-
guishing some different time periods that we can identify in relation to
crime and punishment. Being clear about these at the outset will allow
me to refer to them as we go along, and will also allow me to restate
my central thesis with greater clarity. The different time periods are:
1. Total Time – the time from the commission of the offence to the
completion of punishment.
Total Time is comprised of:
2. Time Until Punishment – time from the commission of the offence to
the commencement of punishment.
3. Duration of Punishment – time from the commencement of punish-
ment to the completion of punishment (in the relevant sense23).
My thesis concerns Duration of Punishment. It says that retri-
butivists should prefer the Duration of Punishment to be as short as
possible (and, therefore, the severity of punishment to be as large as
possible). But it should be observed at the outset that a short
Duration of Punishment should be preferred by the retributivist
because of the contribution this will make to a short Total Time.
The state’s control over the duration of period 2 – Time Until
Punishment – is limited. And for the parts that are under the state’s
control (investigation and trial) there are good reasons to take our
time at this stage.24 Justice done hastily, after all, is often not justice
at all, and retributivists, of course, want justice to be done.25 (All else
equal – including accuracy of investigation and trial – however, my
23 I have introduced this parenthetical clause since an offender will, for example, ‘experience the
effects’ of prison long after he is released, but if the deprivation of liberty is the relevant experience of
imprisonment (the ‘metric’ of the punishment) then he will no longer being experiencing punishment in
the relevant sense, and punishment will have been completed. My thesis is only committed to the view
that just punishments have a duration, and is neutral as to how we should measure the duration of any
given punishment.
24 I am grateful to Lucia Zedner and a Law and Philosophy referee for encouraging me to
acknowledge this point.
25 A Law and Philosophy referee has put it to me that such considerations should also lead us to prefer
longer and lighter punishments, since we may need to reverse punishments if a miscarriage of justice is
discovered later. There are two things to be said here. Firstly, it must be recalled that my claim is an all
else equal claim, and differences in the reversibility or compensability of punishments renders things
unequal. Secondly, the referee’s point actually leads to the conclusion that we should prefer reversible
or compensable punishments. It is not obvious to me that these will necessarily be the longer and lighter
ones. I will set all complications concerning the accuracy of the criminal justice system aside in what
follows.
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argument suggests that retributivists should prefer short Time Until
Punishment too.) But however long Time Until Punishment lasts,
we then arrive at sentencing, and if we are to keep Total Time
down, we must keep Duration of Punishment down. This will
involve selecting the punishment that delivers the amount of pun-
ishment deserved the quickest, which will be the punishment with
the highest (average26) severity.
III. NON-PUNISHMENT OF THE DESERVING
Retributivists generally present their theories positively. That is, they
try to show that punishment is justified when and (at least in part)
because it is deserved. Comparatively little attention has been paid to
understanding the corresponding claim that not punishing the
deserving is bad. This may seem unproblematic – if one claim is the
reverse of another, then (it might be thought) it doesn’t matter
which claim we focus on.
I think that it is important for us to focus on this badness claim in
trying to understand retributivism and its commitments.27 This is
partly because, as I hope to show in this section, there are in fact
several ways to understand or interpret the claim that non-punish-
ment is intrinsically bad, and this is hidden from view when focusing
on the positive claim.28 It is also natural to focus on and interrogate
the badness claim, since a lot of the intuitive force of the retributivist
position is to be found in the fact that something seems to be amiss
when we do not punish wrongdoers. As Victor Tadros (no friend of
26 We can contrast average severity with peak severity. It is average severity the retributivist should
focus on. To see the difference, imagine P can be delivered only by very light continuous punishment,
taking ten years, or by four short sharp shocks (each lasting a day) but which must be spaced five years
apart, such that Duration of Punishment will be twenty years in total. In the latter, the ‘peak severity’ is
higher, but the retributivist will prefer the former, where the ‘average severity’ is higher (indeed, is
twice as severe).
27 As Lucia Zedner and Hamish Stewart have pointed out to me, one of the most famous passages in
penal philosophy appears to present the retributivist badness claim. Kant writes: ‘Even if a civil society
were to be dissolved…the last murderer remaining in prison would first have to be executed, so that
each has done to him what his deeds deserve and blood guilt does not cling to the people for not having
insisted upon this punishment’. Immanuel Kant, in Mary Gregor (ed.), The Metaphysics of Morals
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 106.
28 For an excellent example of the questions, issues and ideas that can arise when we switch our
focus from a popular claim about goodness to the relevant badness claim, see Larry S. Temkin’s
investigation of the claim ‘inequality is bad’, in Inequality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). As
Temkin himself has emphasised, retributivism and egalitarianism have important similarities. See his
‘Equality, Priority and the Levelling Down Objection’, in Matthew Clayton and Andrew Williams
(eds.), The Ideal of Equality (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
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retributivism29) notes, many people become attracted to retributiv-
ism, and come to believe in the possibility that making offenders’
lives go worse is intrinsically good, by thinking about cases which
seem to support the badness claim – cases where punishing a serious
moral wrongdoer will do no further good, but where we feel that
leaving them unpunished will be morally problematic:
Imagine [writes Tadros] a person who has committed a number of racially
motivated murders. And suppose that once this has been discovered and he has
been identified, punishing him would have no deterrent effects. Even though he
has not been reformed, and continues to believe that he was right to commit his
racist murders, we are now sure that he poses no further threat to us. Punishing
him, in this case, would appear to lack instrumental benefits. And yet we would
not wish him to go on living happily in society, going about his day-to-day
business. We would want to see him suffer.30
Retributivism, then, receives extensive intuitive support not through
thinking about punishing wrongdoers – not through thinking about
people rotting away in jail and that bringing joy to our hearts – but
rather through thinking about a world in which those who have
done serious wrongs are not punished. Since the badness claim seems
to be a large part of what is attractive about retributivism, it is
perhaps surprising that it has not received more attention.
Here I want to focus our attention on that badness claim. In doing
so, I will present a series of interpretations or elaborations of the
claim, focusing on the badness of non-retribution’s relationship to
time.31 I will then (in the following section) show how each plausible
view nevertheless leads to the rejection of the Indifference Claim.
In order to show that there are a variety of ways in which we can
interpret the badness claim, which will help us to establish how bad
the non-punishment of a given offender is, I will use the following
three cases. In each case, the offender initially commits the exact
same crime, and in each case the punishment is just and
29 Tadros, The Ends of Harm, esp. Chaps. 3–4.
30 Ibid., p. 44.
31 In his brief discussion of desert and time in his The Geometry of Desert (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012), pp. 10–12, Shelly Kagan focuses on time’s effect on whether or not we are deserving of
something, whereas here I am chiefly interested in the relationship between time and us not getting
something that we in fact deserve (though my discussions of identity move us more into the vicinity of
Kagan’s questions). Similarly, George Sher’s discussions of desert and time focus on why it is that the
past matters for desert claims and not on how quickly desert should be realised or how to understand
the relationship between time and desert not being realised. See his Desert (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1987), Chap. 10.
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proportionate. Furthermore, all else is equal – all the protagonists
have the same length of life, and the same quality of life (other than
differences traceable to punishment), and their identities (and what
underpins them) do not undergo any kind of change that could
render them less deserving of punishment over time.
Andrew is caught and punished immediately. Barbara is only caught and punished
fifty years later. Charlotte is never caught or punished. She dies fifty years later.
It will be observed that these cases do not directly engage the issues
raised by the Indifference Claim – length and severity of sentence
(Duration of Punishment) – since all the punishments (we can
imagine) are, once delivered, instantaneous. However, the idea is to
use these cases (which focus on Time Until Punishment) in developing
a series of understandings of the badness of non-punishment, and its
relationship to time. I will then use these understandings to see what
retributivists should think about Duration of Punishment, showing
that each understanding pushes them toward quicker (and, in order to
keep P constant, harsher) punishments.
A. The Brute Time View
I take it that when we think of cases like Tadros’, we are troubled by
Barbara- and Charlotte-like cases, in which people who have committed
serious wrongs and are then left wandering free and unpunished
(in these cases, for 50 years). This may make us think that what is bad
about non-punishment is that for a given length of time there is a
retributive injustice. This may then lead us to the thought that the
badness of non-punishment is to be calculated by the moral importance
of punishing the person, and the time that elapses between the punish-
ment-worthy act (when they become deserving of punishment) and the
deserved punishment, such that, as long as the person remains unpun-
ished, things keep getting worse. Call this the Brute Time View. The Brute
Time View can be supported by the following two plausible propositions.
[1] It is a bad state of affairs when someone who deserves punishment is
left unpunished.
[2] A bad state of affairs is worse the longer it goes on.
[1] seems to follow from the Retributivist Belief. To see the plausibility
of [2], consider inequality. If we think an inequality is bad, then the
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longer the inequality exists for, the worse things seem to be – an
inequality that lasts a generation is worse than one that exists for a day.
Or consider demonstrators on a march. It would be odd to hear: ‘What
do we want?’ ‘Justice!’ ‘When do we want it?’ ‘Who cares?!’ The right
answer is surely ‘Now!’ We should, it seems, prefer that justice be done
sooner rather than later, and given that retributivist justice won’t be
done until the offender is caught and punished, it seems that we should
also prefer punishment sooner rather than later.32
However, the Brute Time View has problems. The first is that it
seems to attribute moral significance to time itself (rather than things –
like human experience – which usually go along with time) and it is hard
to see why time itself should have this significance. Imagine that before
being pricked by the spinning wheel, Sleeping Beauty commits a horrific
crime. She falls asleep for 100 years, and, upon waking, is immediately
punished. (We can also imagine that her victim and any other involved
parties also fall asleep for 100 years.) Would the passage of time itself
make things worse and worse, such that things are worse than Barbara?
The Brute Time View also has the consequence that Charlotte is
infinitely worse than Barbara (and Andrew). Since Charlotte dies, and
thus will never be punished for her crime, things will keep getting
worse as this injustice continues.33 It seems plausible to me that
Charlotte is worse than Barbara, but it seems implausible that things
keep getting worse ad infinitum.34 Is it a little worse today than it was
32 It may be thought that the Brute Time View (and the Existing Bad Person View explored below)
will only be attractive to those who hold a telic view of retributive justice (see n. 6). Whilst I agree that
there is a natural fit between these views and telic retributivism, I think it plausible that a deontic
retributivist might endorse one of them. When I have an undischarged duty (and where that duty does
not have a temporal component built into it, like promises often do) it seems plausible to believe that
(all else equal) the sooner I fulfill my duty, the better.
33 I assume here that there is no post-death divine retribution. Michael Moore’s support for
retributive legal institutions is underpinned by his atheism (Placing Blame, p. 152), suggesting that if we
believe in divine retribution, we ought not to have retributive legal institutions, as if God exists, we
really ought to leave these things to Him, as He will no doubt do a much better job of delivering justice
than we do. This is interesting for us here because the In the End View (see below) will agree with
Moore, whilst the Brute Time and Existing Bad Person Views will provide reasons (though not decisive
ones) for us to punish here on Earth even if there is a God who can punish later. I am grateful to Saul
Smilansky for useful comments here.
34 It is worth elucidating the phrase ‘keep getting worse’ to avoid a misunderstanding. This is not to
say that the injustice is getting bigger (such that more punishment would fix it – modulo the kinds of issues
raised at n. 16) but rather that the injustice remains of the same size (and so will take the same amount
of punishment to fix), and the longer this goes on, the worse the overall badness of that injustice gets. If
we think of a graph, with the y axis as ‘retributive injustice’, and the x axis as ‘time’, then, as we move
to the right, the line is flat (i.e., the injustice remains constant), but the area under the graph (the overall
badness) is growing. However, it would continue to take the same amount of punishment to reconnect
the line with the x axis. That is the view I am seeking to describe here.
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yesterday that Jack the Ripper still hasn’t been punished? This seems
unlikely. Once the Ripper has died, the badness of not punishing him
seems fixed. Things don’t get any worse, but the badness of not
having punished someone who deserved to be punished remains.
B. The Existing Bad Person View
We may come to reject the Brute Time View because we think that
what seems bad in cases like Tadros’ above is that there is an existing
person in our society who deserves some punishment and who is not
getting it. They (unlike Jack the Ripper or Sleeping Beauty) are going
around having a normal life while they should be being punished.
Once the deserving person no longer exists, the badness of the sit-
uation does not change – there is no longer anyone who deserves
punishment walking around not being punished. Proposition [2],
above, remains valid, but the badness specified by Proposition [1] is
specified in a different way. What matters is not that someone has
not been justly punished, but rather that a currently existing,
thinking, experiencing person35 has not received some punishment
he deserves. As this state of affairs persists, things keep getting worse.
This gives us a view which we can call the Existing Bad Person View.
On this view, the longer a person who deserves some punishment is
around in our society and is not punished, the worse things get. This
makes Barbara worse than Andrew, and Charlotte worse than Andrew.
This seems plausible – it seems likely, as I said before, that the longer
some bad state of affairs persists then the worse things are. In Andrew
the retributive badness is rectified immediately, whilst in Barbara and
Charlotte the badness exists for 50 years.
The difficulty with the Existing Bad Person View is that it suggests
that Barbara, in which the deserved punishment is (eventually) deliv-
ered, is as bad as Charlotte, even though Charlotte dies blissfully
unpunished. In both cases, there was 50 years of the retributively bad
state of affairs in which a person who should be punished was walking
around unpunished. This bad state of affairs is ended through death in
one case and deserved punishment in the other. If that state of affairs
and its persistence is what matters in determining the badness of non-
punishment, then the two cases are equally as bad.
35 I include so many (perhaps unnecessary) adjectives in order to separate the normal cases that
I mean to capture here from the Sleeping Beauty case.
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C. The In the End View
If we think that Charlotte is worse than Barbara, then we might be
attracted to the In the End View. On the In the End View, what
matters is that the deserving are punished in the end. It is bad that
the deserving go unpunished, but as soon as they get their just
deserts, all is well with the world (from the perspective of retributive
justice). On this view, Barbara is better than Charlotte, since Barbara
gets her just deserts and Charlotte does not. But on the In the End
View Barbara is not worse than Andrew – since both end up getting
their just punishment. The In the End View cares that before they
become unavailable for punishment (e.g., die36) those deserving of
punishment are punished. It does not care how long it takes for the
punishment to come about – time is irrelevant. On this view, what is
bad about cases like Tadros’ is not that there is someone currently
living in our community who has yet to be punished for his crime,
but rather that there is a risk that he will not be punished at all, or
will be punished insufficiently. Provided he is punished in the end
(and proportionately), though, we should be content (from the ret-
ributivist perspective).
Like the other two views, the In the End View has some potential
problems. As I said before, our demonstrators who care about justice
but don’t mind when it arrives seem to have an odd position.
Consider the families who struggle for years to ensure that justice is
done to those who have seriously harmed them or their loved ones.
Their desire for justice may have troubling or morally irrelevant
psychological bases (such as a desire for revenge or ‘closure’), but,
from the moral perspective, should they be equally content with
justice being done years down the line, rather than at the time of the
offence? Would it not be reasonable for them to say that it is pref-
erable, in and of itself, that justice is done sooner rather than later?
None of these three views – the Brute Time View, the Existing
Bad Person View, and the In the End View – may, on their own,
provide the most attractive or plausible view about the badness of
the non-punishment of the deserving. Perhaps the central insights or
concerns of some of them should be combined. For example, if
retributive justice is a value, and thus not punishing people who
36 I shall explain later some other ways, short of death, in which people may become ‘unavailable for
punishment’.
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deserve punishment is bad, then it seems to me likely that the longer
we wait to punish them, the worse things are, since an existing
person who should be punished wandering round unpunished is a
bad state of affairs (and therefore that Barbara is worse than Andrew)
and that it is important that we punish them in the end (and
therefore that Charlotte is worse than Barbara). Therefore, some
combination of the concerns that drive the Existing Bad Person View
and the In the End View may be the best view.
However, for my central thesis here – that retributivists should
reject the Indifference Claim – it does not matter if and how these
concerns are combined. This is because each view independently
recommends the rejection of the Indifference Claim, and, further-
more, each recommends its rejection in favour of shorter, more
severe punishments over longer, less severe ones.
IV. THE REJECTION OF THE INDIFFERENCE CLAIM
In this section I will show that all three of the understandings of the
badness of non-punishment and its relationship to time outlined in
Sect. III lead the retributivist to preferring short, harsh punishments
over longer, less severe ones. You may be wondering how the above
section can relate to questions about the length of punishment. After
all, the positions developed in Sect. III were developed in response to
cases which differed on (a) whether punishment was delivered at all,
and (b) if it was, how long it was before it was delivered – they seem
to point towards issues around and positions about when punish-
ment should begin (i.e., Time Until Punishment), not how long
punishment should last once it’s in progress (i.e., Duration of Pun-
ishment). How could these positions tell us anything about Duration
of Punishment – about whether we should prefer shorter or longer
punishments, or, as the Indifference Claim suggests, be indifferent
about the length of punishment?
The reason that these theories about the badness of non-pun-
ishment and their relationship to time can tell us something about
Duration of Punishment is not to be found in the intuitions or cases
that led to us, above, developing or endorsing the different views
about the badness of non-punishment, but rather what those views,
once developed, tell us about the Total Time, and thus (derivatively)
about Duration of Punishment.
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A. The Brute Time View
The Brute Time View says that whilst we are waiting for deserved
punishment to be delivered (Time Until Punishment), this is a bad
state of affairs, since there is a retributive injustice which is yet to be
rectified. The longer this state of affairs persists, the worse things are.
Since once we are in the process of punishing someone they nev-
ertheless still deserve some punishment (otherwise we would stop
punishing them), then until we have completed the punishment, the
bad state of affairs of undelivered deserved punishment remains.
Since what we care about, on the Brute Time View, is getting to the
stage of having made things retributively just (and thus to have
delivered all deserved punishment) as soon as possible, then we
should care about how quickly punishment is completely delivered.
In other words, we should favour as short a Total Time as possible,
and so should favour as short a Duration of Punishment as possible.
Indeed, the Brute Time View would prefer a late start to punishment
followed by very quick and severe punishment over an immediate
start to punishment coupled with long and light punishment – it is
focused on when punishment is over, and justice has been done, and
getting to that point as quickly as possible.
B. The Existing Bad Person View
The inference from the Existing Bad Person View to the issue of how
quickly (and therefore harshly) deserved punishment should be
delivered is less clear. That is because of an ambiguity around what,
at root, bothers us about the existing bad person – that there is an
existing person who deserves some punishment and has not yet had
it, or that there is an existing person who deserves some punishment
and is not currently receiving any punishment. Which is a bad state
of affairs – that a deserving person has not yet been fully punished,
that a deserving person is not yet receiving her punishment, or both?
Call the version of the Existing Bad Person View in which the only
thing that is bad is that there is an existing person who still deserves
punishment the Completion Version, and the version in which the only
thing that is bad is that punishment is not yet being delivered the
Commencement Version. I will first show what each view implies for
the length of deserved punishment retributivists should prefer. I will
TIME AND RETRIBUTION
then try to show that the Commencement Version is implausible –
a concern for when punishment begins is only plausible in combi-
nation with a concern for when it ends (the concern behind the
Completion Version) and/or a concern for it being delivered in full
(the concern behind the In the End View).
The Completion Version clearly recommends quick and severe
punishment. On this view, it is bad that some existing person
deserves some punishment that they have not yet had, and the
longer this state of affairs persists (or is experienced) the worse things
get. Therefore, we will want to ensure that the person has all the
punishment that they deserve as soon as possible. Even once we are
punishing someone, they are a still an existing person who deserves
some punishment and so we should aim to complete punishment as
soon as possible.
On the Commencement Version, we don’t seem to have such a
reason to prefer quicker to slower punishment. This view states that
what is bad is that some wrongdoer is not currently in the process of
being punished, not that they have yet to be punished fully – it is
entirely focused on Time Until Punishment. So, provided the pun-
ishment begins quickly, retributivists have no reason to prefer any
combination of S and t over any other. The attraction of the
Commencement Version can be seen when we think of Tadros’ case
of the racist murderer happily living amongst us, and the sense of
injustice that this example engenders. What seems to drive our sense
of injustice here is that the person is not being punished. But in order
to escape any ramifications for the Indifference Claim, the Com-
mencement Version must stand alone, and not be coupled with
concerns about when or if punishment is completed. I will now
argue that this is implausible.
Consider two criminals, convicted of the same crime, and sen-
tenced immediately, so both wait the same amount of time before
beginning their punishment. Both punishments are deprivations of
liberty and are (overall) equal to one another and proportionate to
the offence (i.e., satisfy P). The first offender is deprived of his liberty
in the ordinary sense, and is given a year in jail. The other is banned
from Birmingham, Alabama (not where he lives, but somewhere he
had thought about going to) for one thousand years. On the Com-
mencement Version, these two cases are equivalent, since in both
PATRICK TOMLIN
the guilty are experiencing punishment after the same amount of
time. Should the retributivist, concerned as they are to see deserved
punishment delivered, view these two cases as equally satisfactory,
and care only about when such punishment begins and not at all
about when, if, or how much of it, is actually finally delivered? Are
we to care that justice is done, or merely that justice is in the process
of being done? The former is surely the more plausible view – and we
should therefore care that justice is fully done, or that as much of it is
done as possible. We should think the situation retributively unjust
while there is still deserved punishment to be delivered, and we
should think injustice a bad thing. Given this, the Commencement
Version is implausible – it may matter when punishment begins, but
such a view should be coupled either with the concerns behind the
Completion Version or the In the End View. I have already shown
how the Completion Version favours faster punishments, and I will
now do the same for the In the End View.
C. The In the End View
The In the End View does not, unlike the Brute Time View and the
Completion Version of the Existing Bad Person View, say that faster
punishments are intrinsically better than slower ones. The In the End
View explicitly does not care about how quickly we get from a state of
affairs in which someone deserves some punishment to the state of
affairs in which this is no longer the case – what matters is that the
person gets the punishment they deserve, and so we can take our time
punishing them. Therefore, in the following kind of case, the In the
End View would endorse the Indifference Claim: Some person de-
serves some punishment. We can make it last 20 seconds or 10 years,
and are sure, either way, that the punishment will be fully delivered.
The problem for the retributivist who wants to endorse the
Indifference Claim, however, is that we are never in that situation.
Whilst, according to the In the End View, we do not bring about a
bad state of affairs by waiting, we will always risk bringing about a
retributively unjust state of affairs by waiting, since, in the interim,
the person may become unavailable for punishment, such that (some
of) their punishment will remain undelivered, and therefore an
injustice will exist which cannot be undone. There is, therefore, a
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contingent argument for faster (and thus more severe) punishments
from the In the End View.
The most obvious way in which we potentially risk injustice by
delaying the full delivery of punishment is that people may die. If a
wrongdoer dies, happily unpunished (like Charlotte) then, on the In
the End View, this is bad. The longer we leave the full delivery of
deserved punishment, the greater the possibility that this bad state of
affairs will come about. Even if we begin punishment immediately,
people may die once it has begun but before it is completed. So, it
seems, we have retributive reasons to ensure the punishment is
delivered as quickly as possible, so as to reduce the risk that the
person will die before punishment is completed.
Should retributivists worry about those who have yet to receive
their full punishment dying before they have received their full
punishment?37 If, plausibly, death is equal to or, more likely, worse
than the most severe form of permissible punishment, then it hardly
seems that by ‘dying on the job’ a prisoner ‘escapes’ some just
punishment. For example, imagine we arrest a 20-year old, and
sentence him to 20 years in jail. Either he completes his sentence and
then goes on to have 40 more years of a wonderful, happy life, or he
dies at 30, half way through his sentence. He is hardly better off
‘escaping’ his second 10 years through death!
There are two things to say to this. The first is that even if this is the
right way to view things, this will still give us reasons to punish the
elderly quickly (and thus severely). The response under consideration
states that offenders who die early do not ‘escape’ punishment but
rather are left worse off than if they had lived through their full pun-
ishment – how much punishment they deserve can only be calculated
within the context of their overall life, including how much suffering
they endure other than at the hands of the criminal justice system.
However, imagine we have an 80-year old who has committed a
serious crime. Given that we know that he has lived for at least
80 years, we know he deserves twenty units of punishment within the
context of that overall (full) life. On the In the End View, we have reason
to ensure that we get all twenty units in before he goes, and thus to
punish him very severely. This implication is, of course, limited in
practice, especially since most crime is committed by the young.
37 I am grateful to Saul Smilansky and Victor Tadros for pressing me to address this.
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However, and this is the second (and more important) point, it is
not clear that what the retributivist should care about is (only)
whether or not the offender ‘gets off’. Only if we think punishment
should be purely about deserved suffering, such that the only point of
the punishment is that the offender’s life goes worse, regardless of
how or why that comes about, should we endorse the view that the
offender remains sufficiently (or, indeed, over-) punished if he dies
early, before serving his full sentence. But this line of thinking has
the following four counter-intuitive consequences. First, we should
not punish those who, for example, lose an arm in an attack on
somebody, if the normal punishment would fall short (in overall
terms, in P terms) of the loss of an arm. Second, nor should we
punish those whose lives we know will be naturally cut short (and,
importantly, we should refrain from such punishment on retributivist
grounds, and not on independent grounds of mercy): ‘Hey, I know
Bob tried to kill you, but he doesn’t deserve any punishment – he’s
got cancer and will die earlier than most’. Third, when, as is normal,
we are uncertain as to when someone will die, this gives us a reason
to refrain from punishing them at all – it risks overpunishment, as if
they are punished and then die early, they will have suffered too
much. Fourth, we should regard those who die early having been
punished as having been treated unjustly. Any early death should
count as punishment or like punishment on such a view.
It seems doubtful that punishment is simply deserved suffering. Do
we impose hard treatment on offenders only to ensure that suffering
is achieved, whilst being indifferent as to whether we, as a society,
shut the door and turn the lock, or whether it is blown closed (for
example) by the wind? Many retributivists would deny this. For
example, they may think that the hard treatment is delivering
deserved censure38 or stigma39 – a communicative message is deliv-
ered through the hard treatment. This isn’t to say that the rela-
tionship between censure and hard treatment is linear (the hard
treatment imposed in the first month in prison may deliver more
censure than the fiftieth month), but simply that hard treatment is
38 Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
39 Douglas Husak writes that ‘most legal philosophers have come to appreciate that punishment
contains not only the element of hard treatment, but also the conceptually distinct component of
stigmatization’. Douglas Husak, ‘Already Punished Enough’, in his The Philosophy of Criminal Law:
Selected Essays, p. 437.
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the vehicle for censure, such that if you haven’t had all your hard
treatment, you haven’t had all your censure.40 Or, retributivists may
think that punishment must be, and is valuable as, hard treatment in
response to offending, and therefore that it must be imposed and in-
tended suffering, such that a natural death or losing one’s hand in an
attack simply does not count as punishment, and is not commen-
surable with it. For these retributivists, then, early death does mean
that the offender departs before having had all of their deserved
punishment, and the In the End retributivist will see this as in at least
one way regrettable. Therefore, all else equal, such a retributivist
should prefer quicker punishments (which will therefore be harsher
punishments) in order to minimize the risk of the offender shuffling
off the mortal coil before justice can be done.
Above, I have distinguished censure and hard treatment, and
argued that since censure is delivered through hard treatment, then
unless the hard treatment is completed prior to death, the offender
won’t have been fully censured and thus justice will not have been
done. Whilst I believe this understanding of the relationship between
censure and hard treatment is the usual one,41 there is an alternative
understanding available, which appears to avoid my claims about
speed and severity of punishment.42 I will now present that under-
standing, and then argue (a) that it is implausible; and (b) that attempts
40 In his thought-provoking essay ‘Already Punished Enough’, Douglas Husak only considers cases
where the extra-legal ‘punishments’ incorporate stigmatizing elements. Thus, even if Husak is right that
extra-legal ‘punishment’ should sometimes be considered in working out how much punishment the
legal system should dispense, he provides no argument in support of early (though natural) death
counting as part of the deserved punishment/suffering.
41 For accounts that appear to treat the relationship between hard treatment and the communicative
aspect of punishment in this way (communication through hard treatment, rather than through the
promise of, or intention of, hard treatment), see: A. P. Simester and Andreas von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms
and Wrongs (Oxford: Hart, 2011), pp. 14–15 (censure is expressed ‘through’ deprivation); Nozick,
Philosophical Explanations, pp. 371–374 (hard treatment ‘effects’ the necessary reconnection between
offender and values); Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1970), p. 99 (the hard treatment itself ‘expresses’ condemnation); Michael Davis, ‘Punishment as Lan-
guage: Misleading Analogy for Desert Theorists’, Law and Philosophy, 10 (1991): 311–322, at pp. 316–318
(imposed hard treatment ‘carries information’); Igor Primoratz, ‘Punishment as Language’, Philosophy 64
(1989): 187–205, at p. 200 (hard treatment ‘translates’ condemnation into the currency of self-interest); F.
H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 25 (it is the hard treatment
that ‘denies the wrong’); A. J. Skillen, ‘How to Say Things with Walls’, Philosophy 55 (1980): 509–523, at
p. 517 (hard treatment is the ‘expression or communication of moralistic and punitive attitudes’);
A. C. Ewing The Morality of Punishment (London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Trubner & Co., 1929), p. 84
(hard treatment ‘impresses’ on the offender that he has done wrong); R. A. Duff, Punishment, Com-
munication and Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 82 (independently of con-
viction, censure is expressed ‘through’ hard treatment).
42 This understanding was put to me, in slightly different ways, by two Law and Philosophy referees
and Jeremy Waldron.
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to avoid that implausibility lead us back to preferring faster punish-
ments.
This alternative understanding goes something like this. The
offender is censured at sentencing, when the state commits to a certain
punishment. Censure is then complete, but must be backed up by
the promised hard treatment. The hard treatment thus simply rein-
forces, in some sense, the censure, but does not deliver it. Given this,
certain disruptions to hard treatment will undermine the message of
censure (and thus create injustice), whilst others will not. If the state
chooses to let an offender out early, for example, it ‘takes back’ the
message, and so the censure is undermined. If, on the other hand,
the offender dies naturally, the message is not undermined, and so
the censure remains complete. Given this, we might think that on
this picture once we have done the censuring (and if the censuring is
what really matters), we can take our time with the hard treatment.
Therefore we can be relaxed about Duration of Punishment.
The first thing to note about this argument is that it still leaves us
with retributivist reasons for preferring fast Time Until Punishment
(or, more precisely, time until censure), and, possibly, some reason
to prefer fast Duration of Punishment. It is still held, on this view,
that some disruptions to hard treatment will undo censure. We
therefore have good retributivist reasons to minimize the possibility
that these disruptions will occur. And it seems likely that the quicker
we get the hard treatment over, the less the likelihood that those
disruptions will come to pass.
More importantly, I think this picture of the relationship between
censure and sanction is incorrect. What this picture seems to require
is for the state to (a) censure; and then (b) intend that the offender
suffer hard treatment, such that if the offender dies before the
completion of hard treatment, this should not trouble us (since the
intention was still there). If that is the case though, what is to stop
the state setting the punishment as being very, very light and very,
very long, such as sentencing a murderer to one thousand years of
being banned from Birmingham, Alabama? It will have intended that
the offender receive the full hard treatment, but it would have
known that he wouldn’t. Is the retributivist to be satisfied by mur-
derers receiving very, very light punishments which, were they to be
experienced for super-human amounts of time, would constitute the
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deserved punishment, even though more severe punishments were
available?43
It will be objected that in such a case the state’s intention isn’t a real
intention, or that the state’s commitment to the offender receiving his
(full) hard treatment must be more fulsome in order for the censure to
be properly conveyed, since in this case the state knows the offender will
never receive his full hard treatment. But if that is the case, the pro-
ponent of this view (and who wants to deny that faster punishments are
retributively better) finds herself atop a slippery slope – one that, I
believe, leads us straight back to faster punishments. Rather than a
1000 year sentence, we could set the punishment to be very light and to
be completed when the offender is 110 years old. There is a chance he
will live to see the full hard treatment through, even though we know
he almost certainly won’t. So we can’t say the state knows he won’t see it
through. But this nevertheless seems unsatisfactory – it doesn’t feel like
the state really means it when it sentences someone to suffer hard
treatment it knows he almost certainly won’t see through. However,
would setting a sentence that was due to be completed when the
offender was ninety be satisfactory? Or eighty?
At this point, the proponent of this view (and who wants to resist
faster punishments) must do one of two things. One option is to
draw a firm line which states exactly how sure the state must be that
the hard treatment will be completed for us to be satisfied that the
commitment to punish is meaningful enough. Any such line, how-
ever, is bound to feel arbitrary. The (more plausible) alternative is to
say that in order for the state’s commitment to be genuine, then for
any two punishments that are otherwise equal, the state should
prefer the punishment which is more likely to deliver the hard
treatment in full (or at least as much as can be permissibly delivered).
In other words, the state will choose the permissible option that will
maximize expected hard treatment. This seems right. It seems a fair
condition to place on my being committed to something coming
43 That more severe punishments are available distinguishes such cases from those where serious
wrongdoers receive, for example, 400 years in prison, as sometimes happens in the United States. First,
let us put aside any scepticism we may have over whether such offenders actually deserve 400 years in
prison – let us concede that that is the proportionate punishment. In that case, in sentencing the
offender to 400 years, the state commits to an amount of punishment it can’t possibly achieve. But, on
the assumption that prison is the most severe form of punishment permissible, then in delivering the
400 year sentence the state (a) communicates the correct amount of deserved punishment (i.e., tells the
truth), and (b) does everything within its power to deliver as much of the promised hard treatment as
possible.
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about that, if everything else is equal, I will prefer the option which
gives the greatest chance of it occurring (or where its occurring in
full is impossible or impermissible, that I prefer the option which will
bring about as much of it as possible). But if this is right, it means
that, all else equal, the state should always prefer faster rather than
slower punishments, since faster punishments mean that there is less
chance of the offender dying in the interim, and therefore that there
is a higher chance that the offender will actually experience the
promised hard treatment (or as much of it as possible).
So far, I have focused on death as a way in which people may
become unavailable for punishment. There are perhaps other ways
in which people may become unavailable for punishment, though
they rely on more controversial positions. Derek Parfit, for example,
argues that what underpins personal identity is psychological con-
tinuousness and/or connectedness (which he calls ‘Relation R’) and
that it is the strength of this relationship between two beings at
different points in time, and not identity, that matters for a variety of
things, including the deservedness of punishment:
When some convict is now less closely connected to himself at the time of his
crime, he deserves less punishment. If the connections are very weak, he may
deserve none.44
Parfit’s view is founded on some controversial metaphysical views
about the persistence of personal identity. But we can endorse Parfit’s
conclusion about the criminal without endorsing his views about
identity. Even if we have a physical view of identity,45 we could have a
Relation R-based view about the persistence of culpability or moral
responsibility, and that may still lead us to endorse Parfit’s conclusion
that the former criminal no longer deserves punishment in the case
above.46 What does it take to be responsible? Most contemporary
compatibilist theories of moral responsibility argue that acquiring
responsibility for some action requires us to have a certain attitude
toward the action (‘real self views’), or to the mental process that
44 Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 325–326. More recently
Parfit has argued against retributivism. See: On What Matters, Vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011), Appendix E. For scepticism about the significance of the ‘selves’ view to desert, see Sher, Desert,
Chap. 9.
45 For explanation and defence of such a view, see Eric T. Olson, ‘Is Psychology Relevant to
Personal Identity?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1994): 173–186.
46 For (slightly) more in-depth discussion, see my ‘Choices, Chance and Change: Luck Egalitarianism
Over Time’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2013): 393–407, at pp. 403–405.
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produces it (‘intellectual process views’).47 Since these are necessary
conditions for acquiring responsibility, it seems plausible that they will
be necessary conditions for retaining responsibility. If we no longer
(fully) endorse the action, or are no longer prepared to accept (full)
ownership of the mental process that produced it, then perhaps we
should no longer be held (fully) responsible for it – and therefore less
deserving of any punishment in relation to it.
Much more would need to be said to fully defend such a view.
But if we are prepared to accept either the identity-based or
responsibility-based story above, then this provides (further) reasons,
on the In the End View, to punish people quickly (and thus harshly).
Let us begin with a case where the person changes so thoroughly
that they no longer deserve any punishment.48 We should, for our
purposes here, view this as being like death. The person who
deserved the punishment has, to all intents and purposes, disap-
peared before we were able to do justice. On the In the End View,
this is bad and one that cannot be rectified, unless the person were to
later revert to a ‘self’ who deserves the punishment.
Now take the case where the person becomes less (but not non-)
deserving. Imagine an offender deserves twenty units of punishment.
He receives ten, and then changes such that he only deserves half the
remaining punishment. He is then punished with a further five units. On
the In the End View, what matters is that deserved punishment is
delivered. On this view, then, it seems that we missed the chance to
deliver some deserved punishment – the state has missed its opportunity
to do full retributive justice. Upon committing the crime, the person
deserved twenty units of punishment, but they never got it. On the In
the End View, this constitutes an injustice which cannot be rectified – it
is like a partial death before full punishment is imposed. Therefore, since
people may die or change, rendering them unavailable for deserved
punishment, retributivists who endorse the In the End View of the
badness of non-retribution should prefer quick and severe punishments.
These considerations also speak in favour of swift (and thus
severe) punishment from the Brute Time View. Since on that view
things will keep getting worse as long as deserved punishment
47 See Elinor Mason, ‘Recent Work: Moral Responsibility’, Philosophical Books 46 (2005): 343–353.
48 Some of the puzzles regarding fundamentally changed former criminals are discussed in Saul
Smilansky, ‘Why Moral Paradoxes Matter? ‘Tefflon Immorality’ and the Perversity of Life’, Philosophical
Studies 165 (2103): 229–243.
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remains undelivered, it is very important to deliver punishment
while we have the chance. If people die or change such that they no
longer deserve punishment, we have missed our window to punish
someone while they deserved it, and things will, therefore, continue
to get worse for ever, as the punishment will never be delivered.
If we accept that people may change such that they no longer
deserve punishment, then on both the Brute Time and In the End
Views, retributivists have reason to punish the person quickly. This is
not the only way that we can try to ensure retributivist justice is
done, however. We could also do so by trying to ensure that the
person does not become unavailable for punishment. In the case of
the dying, this means trying to keep offenders alive such that we can
squeeze our punishment in before they go. In the case of people
changing, however, this will mean trying to ensure offenders do not
change. Since if any changes can lead to one being less deserving of
punishment they are likely to be positive changes, involving the
rejection of criminal acts or the mental processes that produced
them, then it is an unattractive feature of Brute Time and In the End
retributivist views that they recommend trying to make sure that
people continue to have bad features which make them deserving of
punishment until they have received all of their deserved punish-
ment. At the least, quick and harsh punishment before change seems
more morally attractive then trying to ensure the evil stay evil while
we slowly punish them. Furthermore, our ability to control how
quick and harsh a punishment is greater than our ability to control
how and when people change (or how long they will live). As such,
for both moral and practical reasons, In the End retributivists should
prefer quick and harsh punishment over trying to ensure that
offenders stay deserving of punishment.
V. CONCLUSIONS
My central claim in this essay is that retributivists should reject the
Indifference Claim – the idea that it is the total amount of punish-
ment that they are concerned with and are thus neutral between
different combinations of severity and duration which make up that
total quantity. In doing so, I have been able to develop retributivist
scholarship, by focusing on the normally neglected retributivist
‘badness claim’ – that the non-punishment of the guilty is bad. In
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Sect. III I developed a series of interpretations of this claim, and then,
in Sect. IV, I was able to show that all these views recommend that
deserved punishment should be delivered quickly.
Qua retributivist, then, the retributivist has reason to prefer shorter
and harsher punishments. It will be for individual retributivists to decide
how they think retributivist and non-retributivist reasons interact, how
strong or important retributivist considerations are in determining the
best or most appropriate punishments all things considered, what the
relevant non-retributivist reasons are, and to which combinations of
S and t the non-retributivist reasons point. However, within retribu-
tivism, so far as I can see, these considerations are decisive, since I am
not convinced that anything points toward slower, gentler punishments
being consistently or inherently retributively better.49 The fastest and
most severe deserved punishment will generally be retributively best.
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